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Resumo
Neste trabalho enumerámos uma série de vulnerabilidades relacionadas com ligação
USB do Android, em especial vulnerabilidades relacionadas com a personalização feita
pelos fabricantes de dispositivos Android.
Uma das principais vulnerabilidades que descobrimos resulta da personalização feita
ao Android por alguns fabricantes, em que torna possível enviar comandos de serie AT
proprietários por USB. Estes comandos AT proprietários que estendem as funcionali-
dades tradicionais dos comandos AT. Com isto é possível injetar código no telemóvel,
que altera a partição boot. O que permite concluir vários objetivos, um deles obter
acesso root.
Estas vulnerabilidades encontradas permitem-nos desenvolver vários ataques, que
depois são ordenamos segundo a sua perigosidade e cujo objetivo é construir uma
hierarquia de ataques de modo a corresponder o ataque mais eficaz que funcione com
o dispositivo conectado
Elaboramos depois uma prova de conceito conjuntamente com um cenário de ataque
concentrados na USB do Android. De seguida com alguns anti-virus Android, para
verificar se de alguma forma estes detetam ou previnem o ataque.
Por fim desenvolvemos uma aplicação capaz de ajudar a mitigar estes ataques. A
aplicação necessita permissão root para ser ativada. Caso não tenha seja permitido
acesso root a aplicação apenas notificará o utilizador dos perigos inerentes a ligações
USB.
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Abstract
In this work, we enumerate a series of vulnerabilities in the USB connection of Android,
specially vulnerabilities related with the customization done by the Android manufactur-
ers.
The crux of the discovered vulnerabilities is a consequence of the vendor customiza-
tion of Android, where the serial AT commands processed by the cellular modem are
extended to allow other functionalities. With this, we are able to flash a boot partition
on the smartphone and obtain several objectives, including root access.
These found vulnerabilities allow us to develop several attack vectors, which are ordered
according with its efficacy, the objective in building an hierarchy that is able to produce
the maximum efficacy attack according to the device.
We develop a proof of concept and an attack scenario specially designed for USB
attacks on Android. We made some tests with popular anti-virus for Android, to examine
if they can prevent or detect the attacks.
Finally, we develop an application capable of mitigating the discovered vulnerabilities,
unfortunately the application needs root access to be activated. In case there is no root
access, we prompt a warning to the user, notifying the dangers he may be in.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The extended functionalities available in smartphones are crucial to explaining its suc-
cess, which lead to a fast transition over traditional phones. Functionalities such as
phone banking, Global Positioning System (GPS), e-mail, together with the old func-
tionalities like phone calling and Short Message Service (SMS) make the smartphone
essential to our daily lives and ease our existence.
One major characteristic that leads to the proliferation of smartphones is its portability.
Such characteristic together with the functionalities mentioned, inevitably lead to an
increase of privacy invasion. Especially attacks that exploit the physical attack surface
on the smartphone.
Attacks such as exploiting the Near Field Communication (NFC) [8, 9] or the Universal
Serial Bus (USB) connection are uncommon attacks, therefore these types of attacks
to a user are very threatening. A continuous research of the practical threat that these
attacks pose should be placed, which is the principal aim employed in this dissertation.
1.1 Problem description
1.1.1 Android OS
The Android platform initially developed by Android inc. and bought by Google in
2005 [10], is an open-source operating system based on Linux kernel for mobile phones.
The first Android phone launched was in 2008 and we have now seen nineteen versions
11
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launched.
Android comprises 80% of the worldwide market share [11], making it the biggest player
on the smartphone business. Vendor customization is one of the advantages of the
Android ecosystem, allowing vendors to customize the operating system. Vendors add
another layer of software over the standard release of the operating system. This is a
double-edged sword, since it could introduce serious security breaches in the vendor
modification of the operating system.
Independently of the Android version, vendors’ customization could lead one product
to be vulnerable and another not. Attackers could exploit different kind of attacks, over
the many different products that run Android. According to a recent study, vendor cus-
tomization accounts for 60% [12] of the vulnerabilities found in the Android ecosystem.
Due to this, the vendor customization layer, is the primary target for the research of
vulnerabilities in this dissertation.
1.1.2 Physical attacks threat
Security experts often overlook the security of USB attacks. Indeed, we have seen an
increasing trend in the usage of physical attacks such as USB. The recent Stuxnet [13]
attack is a good example. It was of most notorious successfully operated attack that
exploited several vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system. Most notably how-
ever was how it spread, from system to system via USB pen drives. The worm efficacy
of Stuxnet is notorious. First, it would spread over USB, infecting the host computer.
Then it would spread over that computer’s network, infecting the USB drives that are
connected. With this strategy, Stuxnet was able to infect over 100 000 computers
worldwide [13], however 99,9% of those infected computers where not the target. The
target of the attack was PLC (Programmable Logic Controllers), which regulated the
centrifuges separating nuclear material in Iranian nuclear power plants. Not just any
PLC, the target was precisely a PLC at a specific nuclear facility in Iran.
Attacks carried out through USB, provide a very effective way of infecting large organi-
zations. Such organizations usually tend to look more to the defense against attacks on
their servers and the entire infrastructure accessible online. Forgetting that employees
have access inside the infrastructure and can very well compromise it by bringing an
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already infected USB pen drive.
Employees may intentionally conduct fraudulent activities as detailed in [14] and directly
steal important information from the company. Employees can use the USB charging
cable connected to a corporate computer, appearing to be charging the smartphone. In
reality, they are using it to transfer data to the smartphone. This way of stealing impor-
tant information from the company is very distinct, because charging the smartphone is
a very common activity and no one would notice it.
Another possibility is that employees are completely unaware of the attack. They carry
the USB pen drive from home to the company or any other intermediate location, they
could be targeted in one of those locations and then later carry malicious code directly to
the company, like in the case of Stuxnet. Employees’ homes PC and firewalls are much
less secure and the attackers know how to take advantage of these circumstances [15].
1.2 Motivation
During the master degree, computer security was always an interest of mine, leading
me to appreciate the complex systems necessary to maintain our privacy in the digital
world. It also made me realize how very easily just a little flaw, a bug, a badly imple-
mented security principal, can break these systems.
Proximity attacks are a good example of this. USB connection’s security, because often
overlooked, contain smaller flaws, which have huge impact on system security.
This led me to pursuit the topic of this dissertation and investigate what kind of flaws
might be explored in the USB connection of Android.
1.3 Proposal
In this dissertation, we explore vulnerabilities in the Android operating system that are
associated with its USB connection. We investigate known and unknown vulnerabilities,
both in the general release of Android but especially in the vendor customizations. On
those we were able to inject malicious code, by flashing a compromised boot partition.
First we build a list of attacks and with that list, we order the attacks by the severity, so
that we can develop a script that according to device connected to the USB, matches
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the corresponding attack higher in the hierarchy.
An attack scenario and a proof of concept that fits the vulnerabilities researched are
also given. This combination of attack scenario and proof of concept should also give
raise to the awareness of the dangers associated with the USB port.
We also mitigate the exposed vulnerabilities with a special designed defense applica-
tion. An application capable of preventing USB port attacks. In the general release of
Android and in the vendor customization.
1.4 Outline
In the rest of the document, chapters are organized as:
Chapter 2 Details the Android security model and provides a view of the currents state
of the vulnerabilities found on Android. It also details the Android attack surface. Lastly,
we enumerate the most relevant exploits that are related with this work.
Chapter 3 Describes vulnerabilities that we have researched and used throughout the
dissertation.
Chapter 4 Explains a proof of concept that makes usage of the vulnerabilities enumer-
ated in chapter 3, as well as some results we had when exploring these vulnerabilities.
We also present an application that is capable of mitigating USB port related attacks.
Chapter 5 Gives an overview of the work employed, explaining what was possible to
achieve, also gives room for future work.
1.5 Publications
A. Pereira, M. E. Correia, and P. Brandão, “USB connection vulnerabilities on android
smartphones: default and vendors’ customizations,” 5th Conference in the "Communications
and Multimedia Security", 2014.
Chapter 2
State of art
In this chapter, we present the Android security model up to the current Android version,
thus describing the Android attack surface. We also describe some of vulnerabilities
and exploits found throughout the Android lifespan, which relates to our work.
2.1 Android Security Model
2.1.1 Linux Kernel
Android at its core uses the Linux kernel, which, from a security standpoint, is very
advantageous. The Linux kernel provides a basic set of tools for the isolation and
execution of processes and for secure Inter-Process communication (IPC) and other
I/O functionalities, like the POSIX system permission [17].
Android borrowed tools for processes isolation from the Linux kernel and are very well
tested. Such tools have been in the Linux environment for many years, which make a
solid foundation that Android can rely on. Currently the last Android version, Android
4.4 KitKat relies on Linux kernel 3.8. The Android operating system is also a cut down
version of the Linux kernel, which reduces the attack surface [18].
2.1.2 Android system permission model
When installing an application, Android uses functionality from Linux in which it at-
tributes a unique user id over that application. Creating what is a called a sandbox,
15
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isolating that application folder and files, as well as virtual memory and its IPC [18].
Applications with a unique user id are like different users in a Linux system. This way
applications are restricted to only their own folders and files.
In Android as well as in Linux, there are privileged users, like root and system, these
users have a static id. The system user is slightly less powerful than root. Root user
exists for running critical system tasks and should not be available to the user. The
system user is for less demanding tasks, such as the control over application’s settings,
when the user wants to enable Wi-Fi communication, for example.
Android has also added some features to the permission system in the Linux kernel for
their own infrastructure [19]. For an application to have access to common resources of
the smartphone, such as Internet, phone calls, read SMS. It needs to be in the correct
group id, each one of those permissions has a unique group id associated with it. The
developers have to declare which permissions they need in the AndroidManifest.xml file,
which goes with the application. If the user accepts those demands, the application will
be associated with that collection of group ids, granting access over all the permissions
asked.
Figure 2.1: Status of youtube application
For example, in figure 2.1 it is possible to see that the youtube application is member of
groups with ids 1006, 1015 and 3003. Therefore, youtube application has permission to
access camera devices, external storage write access and Internet access. In figure 2.2
we can see an extract of the Android filesystem config file, in which those permissions
are declared and the associated ids.
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Figure 2.2: Hardcoded permissions with their asssociated ids from [1]
2.1.3 ADB key pairing
An USB connection and an Android Debug Bridge (ADB) enabled Android, could pose
a serious security threat. So serious that since Android version 4.2.2, Google made a
security enhancement to the ADB connection. Making sure that every USB connection
has an accepted RSA key pair to the host computer that the Android device is connected
to. So every new USB host that the Android smartphone tries to connect to, has to have
been previously accepted by the user [20].
2.1.4 Application Signing
Each application for Android must be self-signed [21], without any central authority. So
the developer of any application has to digital sign it with its own private key, which is
provided when creating a developer account.
Applications can request a shared id, from other applications, requesting that both
applications share the same id. In that case, Android shared user mechanism will
detect if the entity that signed the application is the same. Developers can request
permissions granted to other applications, if they share the same signature.
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2.2 Analysis to Android security
2.2.1 Patch cycles
When a new vulnerability is found a new patch must be developed and delivered as
fast as it can be, so that it reduces the number of infected devices. However, this is not
exactly what is happening.
As we mentioned, Google allows vendors and carriers to modify Android to satisfy
their needs. Enabling vendors to customize the device with default applications and
functionalities. This results in a timely increase on the patch release. First the patch
has to pass on to the vendor and then to the carrier and only then they will reach the
end user [2].
Figure 2.3: Life cycle from vulnerability found and a patch to that vulnerability be released in Android
system permission file from [2]
As shown in the Figure 2.3, a vulnerability is discovered in step A, then disclosed in B,
which is when Google starts developing a patch. Google releases it in step D, then two
additional steps are required, until it finally reaches the end user. Step E. Step F is the
step where the carrier releases it to the end users. Note that it is up to the manufacturer
to release or not a patch to the users, sometimes it is not. It is estimated that the gap
on steps E and F is of four months [2].
2.2.2 Common vulnerabilities and exposure analysis
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) accounts and catalogs known vulnera-
bilities of some technology or product, like Android. This information is taken from the
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National Vulnerability Database1. When a vulnerability is disclosed, it is given a single
identifier. The NVD catalogs this information, with a description, a threat level score
and associated type of attack, like privilege escalation, memory corruption, etc.
Figure 2.4: Number of Android vulnerabilities by year from [3]
Figure 2.4 shows the number of disclosed vulnerabilities by year, from 2009 until 2014.
2010 being the year with the lowest number of disclosed vulnerabilities. The year with
the most disclosed vulnerabilities is 2011.
Figure 2.5: Android vulnerabilities by type from [3]
Figure 2.5 represents the number of vulnerabilities by type, with Denial of service having
more vulnerabilities disclosed, followed by code execution. The types with less attached
vulnerabilities are memory corruption attacks and gain information attacks.
Figure 2.6 presents the span of vulnerabilities according to the CVE threat level score,
1NVD is the U.S. government repository of standards based vulnerability management data
http://nvd.nist.gov/
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Figure 2.6: Android vulnerabilities by threat level score from [3]
where the highest score means that the vulnerability is more damaging. The size of
the bubble represents the number of vulnerabilities disclosed, the color the threat level,
which is also represented by the location of the bubble according to the y axis. It is
possible to see that the vulnerabilities disclosed for Android are in general serious. This
Information on the last figure 2.6 is from 24th of April of 2013 until 28th of April of 2014.
2.3 Android Attack Surface
Attack surfaces are logical paths where systems could be vulnerable. They provide a
means to an end. Studying surfaces could lead to attack vectors, in a sense they are
exposed areas in which the system could be vulnerable. Attack vectors on the other
hand are more about what is, instead of what could be. An attack vector could be the
use of a specific vulnerability from an attack surface. For example, an attack surface
could be the mailing system of some network. An example of an attack vector could be
a vulnerability inside the e-mail filter system. To that network, one of its attack surfaces
would be the mailing system.
Since Android encompasses a large range of operations, from web browsing to SMS,
games, applications, calls, GPS, etc. Its attack surface is of some magnitude. There
are three main categories of attack surfaces. These are the remote attack surface, local
attack surface and physical attack surface.
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2.3.1 Remote Attack surface
The remote attack surface is where the attacker exploits vulnerabilities from remote
access. Such as a direct attack to the smartphone’s IP. It also could be adjacent, where
the attacker is in the same network as the smartphone. Alternatively, it can also be by an
intermediary. An attacker could fake a description and utilities of an application, make
users download and install a malicious application from Google app store. Although,
since February of 2012, Google launched a security service to the app store, called
Bouncer, which scans the application for evidences of malware.
From a remote access, using an intermediary, the attacker could also explore vulner-
abilities on the client side of the structure, such as the web browser, specially the
webkit engine inside the smartphone. Attacking the webkit, could not infect just the
web browser, but other web powered Application Programming Interface (API).
These kinds of attacks are likely to be the preference of the attacker. It would be the
first step pursued to gain entrance on the system and further compromised it.
2.3.2 Local Attack surface
The local attack surface is where the attacker achieves local execution of code. In
comparison with the remote surface, in which the attacker explores vulnerabilities of
remote access, to achieve local execution of code. In the local attack surface, the
attack explores vulnerabilities from inside the smartphone. This could be done through
malicious applications, ADB shell. This way an attacker only has common access to
the smartphone, the attacker is limited to that.
An attacker upon this stage would want to escalate the privileges from a common user,
where he is in. This escalation will increase the power of access that the attacker has
to execute code, explore the smartphone, as well as use the access to scan information
about the user.
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2.3.3 Physical Attack surface
With the physical attack surface, an attacker explores vulnerabilities from physical struc-
tures such as USB or NFC. This leads the attacker to use obstructive or non-obstructive
attacks. In the first case, the attacker steals the device for a short time span, uses a
portable device, with computational capabilities to inject malware on the device. In the
latter case, the victim leads himself to being infected, like when he wants to charge the
smartphone, it could lead him to connecting the USB to a public infected kiosk.
2.4 Attacks and Exploits
2.4.1 Injecting SMS Messages into Smart Phones for secure analysis
With the introduction of second generation cellphones, SMS has been used frequently
for people to exchange information in relativity short time. By exploring the way in
which SMSs are sent and delivered in smartphones, the authors of [4] developed a
high-degree Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM) attack to the SMS infrastructure of the
three main smartphone operating systems. Namely, iOS, Android and Windows phone.
With the purpose of analyzing the secure vulnerabilities within the SMS infrastructure
through fuzz testing. The attack outline is the same for all three operating systems, but
the implementation is different for obvious reasons. In iOS all baseband communication
is dealt by CommCenter process, which uses sixteen different serial lines as interface
communication with the modem. The Android OS relies on the Radio Interface Layer
(RIL), as common interface in the application framework for the application layer. The
way in which the actual communication is done after the application framework, may
vary from vendor to vendor, typically a single daemon communicates with the modem
also through a serial device file. The windows mobile operating system is a bit different
from the latter two, since it is larger and more distributed due to the fact that just for
SMS communication, the application relies on a library just for that process.
We will focus on the Android implementation of the attack. The authors develop what
they call an “injector” that stands between the telephony stack and the actual modem,
intercepting the sent and receive AT commands, as it is possible to see in figure 2.7.
This injector conceptually is the same for all the MITM attacks they use for every OS.
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Figure 2.7: Conceptual model of injector from [4]
On the Android operating system, the implementation was done with a single daemon,
this daemon connects with the serial line device whose purpose it is to talk with the
modem. For the injector to work, First they rename /dev/smd0 (the original de-
vice file for communication) to /dev/smd0real, then open the /dev/smd0real and
then create a fake /dev/smd0. Upon restart of the Radio Interface Layer Daemon
(RILD), it will communicate with the fake /dev/smd0, the modem will communicate
with /dev/smd0real.
So the communication is, RILD ⇔ /dev/smd0 ⇔ injector ⇔ /dev/smd0real ⇔
modem. This is so because the renamed original still holds the physical properties
to talk with the modem.
With this, the injector has the ability to listen to every message sent and received, as
well it has also the ability to send messages.
The injector listens to TCP port 4223 on all interfaces, to receive the SMSs that are
about to be sent, by a computer on the same Wi-Fi network as the smartphone.
Fuzz testing is a kind of test, wherein the program being tested receives random struc-
tures as input, simultaneously being monitored for the kind of problems and bugs it
might arise. The purpose of the authors is then, to implement this MITM to explore and
find vulnerabilities on the SMSs infrastructure. A SMS message could be of several
types, such as:
• Basic SMS Messages, typical SMS message.
• Concatenated SMS Messages, concatenated SMS messages.
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• Basic UDH Messages, UDH stands for User data header, it is the binary structure
presented at the start of a SMS, could convey different types of information,
representing the type of SMS being sent.
• UDHPort Scanning, On the user data header, you could register the SMS for a
specific port, SMS applications could listen to that port, similar to TCP port. With
this, the authors scanned the ports, monitoring which applications were listening.
In the Android analysis, monitoring was done over ADB . That way it is possible to read
the Android logcat.2
With that, it was possible to monitor the events and bugs that some SMS messages
might induce. In the Android system, it was also possible to discover DOS attacks,
namely the crashing of the com.Android.phone, which represents the Android phone
application. Also the locking of the SIM card. Note that this is only possible if the actual
SMS codification that causes the bug, is not modified or filtered over the GSM network,
the authors were not specific about it if it were or not.
2.4.2 OldBoot
Oldboot is one of the first Android bootkits ever found in the wild. In 17th of January
of 2014 it was estimated that it had infected more than five hundred thousand Android
devices in China only [5]. There were no reports of infected devices outside of China.
Which leads to believe that the attack is executed either by proximity, like USB connec-
tion or Wi-Fi network.
Oldboot affects the boot partition of the Android operating system injecting it with mali-
cious content, making it undetectable by normal procedures.
Figure 2.8 shows how the infection is orchestrated:
1. Upon boot, the init.rc inside the boot will launch imei_chk as a system
service and a socket attached to it.
2. The imei_chk will extract both the libgooglekernel.so to /system/lib/,
the library folder and GoogleKernel.apk to /system/app/ the applications
2Logcat is the main logging system, providing a way to report and log events, crashes etc.
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF ART 25
Figure 2.8: Oldboot file scheme from [5]
folder.
3. Since the GoogleKernel.apk is in /system/app/ it will be installed as an
application when booting. The application makes use of JNI, java native interface
to communicate with the library libgooglekernel.so
4. The libgooglekernel.so being a .so file, a static compiled library, can be
called by any process with permission to access it, to execute something, which
is what GoogleKernel.apk does. Triggering malicious content.
5. The GoogleKernel.apk then sends shell commands to the imei_chk by the
socket with port number 666, which was registered when booting, by the init.rc
file, execute them. Since imei_chk is running as root every command will be
executed as root.
If the device is infected, any application can use the same port 666 to send commands
in order for the imei_chk to execute, putting the infected device in an even more dan-
gerous position. The role GoogleKernel.apk application is to connect to command
and control servers, in order to receive commands to be executed by the attackers and
later executed by libgooglekernel.so,so GoogleKernel.apk is really a hidden
complex Remote Access Tool (RAT).
The Chinese researches that discovered oldboot, also made available an application to
detect and disable the malware.
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2.4.3 Samsung Galaxy Back-door
A team of Samsung replicant developers [22], found a vulnerability in most Samsung
Galaxy smartphones that enabled the modem operating system to access the internal
storage of the Android operating system and write on it. This violates one vital security
principal, the privilege separation. Typically, the modem should not have the ability to
write inside Android, also Android should not have the ability to write inside the modem,
since they are both separate things. Both should communicate by a standard protocols,
whose features are well known, like the AT commands for the GSM configuration.
The problem is in the Samsung RIL, which handles communication from Android OS to
the modem OS. It implements a feature that allows the modem to issue Remote File
System (RFS) requests.
For a proof of concept, the developers had to compile a new modem kernel that could
exploit this ability and install it in a modem used by a Samsung device. They were able
to write a file in /data/radio/test with the string “hello world”. The default folder
for writing is /efs/root/, however they could escape this using ../ to access the
previous folder in the hierarchy, thus write anywhere. If the Android OS implements SE
Linux, the scope of file to access may be restricted.
Serious threats could not arise, since first the attackers have to infect the modem first,
but the Android OS should not have to rely on the security of the modem for its internal
system, the privilege separation is a security principal not employed here.
The replicant developers have released a patch in their replicant software that mitigated
the problem.
Chapter 3
Vulnerabilities assessment
In this chapter, we describe the vulnerabilities that we found on the Android operating
system, namely the vulnerabilities found in its USB connection. We use USB connec-
tion with the Android smartphone as an attack surface, thus gaining entrance into the
system.
Of those Android vulnerabilities, we give special emphasis to the vulnerabilities that
we found on the vendor customization of the smartphone. Namely, we explore the
vendor customization of the Samsung smartphone family. Some vulnerabilities are
documented commands and others were discovered in our work.
We also describe an attack scenario capable of exploring the vulnerabilities described.
3.1 Attack scenario
In order for an attacker to exploit these vulnerabilities, it must control an USB connection
to the victim device and hold on the other end of the connection a computational
system capable of exploiting said vulnerabilities. An attacker could perhaps, hold a
small computer with a USB connection and “borrow” the victims’ device, for a short
period, without him noticing it. In that, time the crux of the attack would be delivered,
i.e. injecting the device with a compromised partition, which we will describe later.
A more practical scenario would be the installation of a public kiosk for charging devices’
batteries, as the one shown in figure 3.1. Since the introduction of the smartphones,
where the battery lifespan has been substantially reduced, compared to previous gen-
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eration of cell smartphones, public charging kiosk, have become a more common
scenario in public areas such as airports and libraries. This reduction in the battery
lifespan increases the chance and consequently the number of times users find them-
selves without battery, which also increases the chance that the users would place their
smartphones in said kiosk
Figure 3.1: Example of a public charging kiosk
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Unknowing that the kiosk was infected, the victim on noticing that their smartphone has
low battery, would try to find the kiosk as a quick fix to the problem and would willingly
connect the device, hoping that it would charge the smartphone batteries. However, the
true purpose of the kiosk would be to inject malicious code into the devices.
Such scenario is very fruitful, since we expect easy acceptance by the victim to place
the smartphone in such a manner. There are a couple of reasons for this.
First, the lack of knowledge of the dangers attached with an exposed USB connection,
given that is such an uncommon practice, even an IT experienced user could possibly
lack this knowledge.
The second reason is the emergency state in which the victim is. Nowadays our
cellphones are an extension of ourselves, it is completely implanted in our daily life
and the lack of it is unthinkable. This is even truer for smartphones, since we can
perform additional tasks on it, like smartphone banking and e-mails. Therefore, a state
where the cellphone battery is empty or almost empty, would easily lead the victim to
expose its device to the kiosk, in order to charge the battery.
Given the nature of such attack, a script is necessary on the computer holding the
other end of the USB cable. A script capable of detecting the smartphone, match
its vulnerabilities and proceed with the attack. For example, a different type of attack
is executed for different Android versions, for different firmware versions, as well as
different brands and different products of those brands. As an example, in the Samsung
smartphone family, there could be an attack for the Galaxy S2 and another attack, using
different vulnerabilities found for the Galaxy S4.
3.2 Vulnerabilities
The following vulnerabilities were researched and used throughout the implementation
of the dissertation proposal. Some of them like ADB enabled, or the master-key vulner-
ability are known vulnerabilities, others like the ability to send proprietary AT commands
over USB are not. It is important to note that neither ADB enabled nor the ability to send
AT commands over USB, are by themselves a vulnerability, but having ADB enable
as default, vendors’ implementations of communication over USB with AT commands,
make them so.
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3.2.1 ADB enabled
The ADB serves as a means of communication between a computer (host) and a
smartphone (device). The communication is done via USB, but it is also possible to
configure the device so that the connection is made through Wi-Fi.
As default, ADB is disabled, but users tend to enabled it for various reasons, mainly
among developers. ADB is enabled to develop applications and install them on the
smartphone, to root the smartphone, for USB docking on the computer. Once enabled
users tend to forget to disable it. According to a recent survey [23] 20% of users
have ADB enabled, which is a significant number compared to the threat capacity that
an ADB enabled poses as an attack vector. This number also indicates the lack of
knowledge that users have of the USB threats.
With ADB enabled, it is possible to [24]:
• Get shell access to the device;
• Install applications that were not verified by the Google app store Bouncer;
• Uninstall applications;
• Mount the SD card;
• Read the logcat;
• Start an application;
Shell access through ADB could also unveil new attack vectors, as shown in [2], where it
is possible to gain privileged access, with rooting techniques like Super One-Click root,
also Cyndia impactor [25, 26]. The latter one explores a much more recent vulnerability
affecting Android smartphones with versions prior to 4.2.
3.2.2 AT Commands
The AT Commands (ATC) are a command language that was initially developed to com-
municate with the Hayes Smartmodems, nowadays it stands as the standard language
to communicate with some types of modems. For example, protocols like GSM and
3GPP [27] use this type of commands as a standard way of communicating with the
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modem. With the ability to issue these commands to the modem, it is possible to:
• Issue calls;
• Send SMS;
• Obtain contacts stored inside the SIM card;
• Alter the PIN;
In order to understand this attack vector, we need to comprehend how a modern
smartphone works. A modern smartphone is built with two operating systems, running
in two very different environments [28]. On one hand, there is the Applications Pro-
cessor (AP), where the Android operating system and all the applications with which
the user interacts run. On the other, there is the Baseband Processor (BP), where the
entire cellular (ex.: GSM) communication is done and where the modem lies. Issuing
AT commands is not the only way to communicate with the modem, but it is the most
popular way, together with Remote Procedural Calls (RPC).
The RIL, Radio Interface Layer [29], is the layer on the operating system responsible for
establishing a communication between the Android operating system and the modem.
In the case the application framework needs to send messages or make calls, it uses
the RIL in the application framework to do so.
Figure 3.2 details the communication stack, from the application framework to the
baseband. Where in the application framework, the RIL uses the Linux IP stack to
communicate with the baseband, establishing the communication channel.
The RIL handles two types of communication: solicited commands and unsolicited
responses. Figure 3.3 illustrates a solicited command sent from the application to the
RIL and then to the baseband. An example of an unsolicited response would be
receiving a call. The communication is initiated from the baseband to the application
framework and then to the application responsible to handle such event.
As shown in 3.3, the main purpose of the RIL is to match every solicited command,
or RIL call, in the application framework to its corresponding AT command and send
it to the modem. Only the RIL issues the commands to the modem. In this case the
solicited command is dialing a number. The RIL layer sends the corresponding AT
command to the baseband. As soon as the baseband finishes dialing the number, it
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Figure 3.2: Android Telephony system architecture from [6]
Figure 3.3: Diagram of a solicited call from [6]
notifies the RIL, which in turn asynchronously notifies the application that made the
call, informing that the dialing has finished and providing with a socket to listen to the
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call.
In this scenario, it is possible to use the USB connection to issue such commands.
This vulnerability is only made possible due to the fact that some Android smartphone
manufacturers, like Samsung and HTC, enable this through the USB channel. This
means that it is possible to send AT commands using the USB connection, such as
the onRequest() AT command from 3.3 directly to the baseband. It is important to
mention that this is not a default feature of the Android, but a manufacturer addition.
In a practical scenario, upon the detection of a new USB device, the driver responsible
for that device recognizes that the device has a modem type of interface through the
USB, notifying the operating system of such. Henceforward the operating system has
a way of communicating with the modem, which can be used in our attack scenario.
Then it is conceivable to send AT commands to make smartphone calls or send SMS to
premium cost numbers. This way, making the attacker earn money, or more accurately
stealing it.
Complementing this, some manufacturers extend this list, adding some proprietary
commands with the purpose of enabling control and capabilities that they want to have
on the system. These commands are private and the manufacturers do not publish
them. However, without the use of some form of encryption, anyone is able to eavesdrop
the communication channel and understand or try to understand, what lies under the
system.
3.2.2.1 AT Samsung proprietary commands
In the case of Samsung, a vast list of its family of smartphones has this vulnerability,
where it is possible to communicate with the modem through the USB channel, without
any previous configuration on the smartphone, something that does not happen with
ADB.
More than the standard AT command set that comes with the 3GPP and GSM stan-
dards, Samsung extends this set adding their proprietary commands. This extends the
capabilities of interaction that their computer Software (Kies) has on the device.
In fact, we discovered that the Kies for windows, uses both the standard set and the
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extended proprietary AT command set, to at least achieve the following operations:
• Obtain contact book
• Obtain files in the SD card
• Update the firmware on the cellphone
3.2.3 Eavesdropping of Kies
Kies software was designed by Samsung to manage the smartphone over USB. Some
of its functionalities include: the ability to update the smartphones’ firmware, backup
contact information, media exchange. We examined how this information was trans-
mitted. The USB trace1 eavesdropping tool was used to see what is transmitted over
USB when a Samsung device is connected to PC and managed by Kies. Also, using
Android logcat, we were able to see the nature of the messages that the Android
internal processes leaked/logged.
With this approach, it was possible to observe something of interest, as pictured in
figure 3.4. It shows that Kies uses a command system for the exchange of information.
Figure 3.4: Eavesdropped AT command
Figure 3.5 shows the logcat of Android on Samsung S-5839i and we can see that
there is a system process called dun_mgr that handles the communications from the
USB to the atx process, dun_mgr obtains the commands transmitted over USB and
1USB Protocol Analyzer http://www.sysnucleus.com/
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sends them to atx, which then executes and responds back to dun_mgr. The atx
process logs its execution with an AT label when it is an AT command and with ATX
label when it is an atx command. We assume from the log that the ATX label is for
commands that are standard to the GSM 3GPP protocol and the AT label is used when
logging Samsung proprietary commands.
Figure 3.5: Logcat of AT commands
The command AT+DEVCONINFO is the first command sent by Kies to the smartphone
that we could eavesdrop. As shown in figure 3.6 it returns information about the
smartphone, such as the model, the firmware version and the IMEI.
Figure 3.6: Eavesdropped of the command AT+DEVCONINFO being sent
After this initial exchange of information, the atx process on Android starts the NPS_MOBEX
service, with the command pcsync_write, as shown in Figure 3.7. After that, we
cannot make sense of the rest of the communication shown in figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.7: Start of the NPS_MOBEX service
Figure 3.8: Eavesdropped information on a latter stage of the communication
3.2.3.1 Samsung internal processes
On Samsung S-5839i and using lsof2 command tool, it is possible to investigate a bit
further. In figure 3.9 shows that two different pipes connect both dun_mgr and atx.
Another process, usb_portd, which purpose is still unknown, which it shares a socket
connection with both dun_mgr and atx.
On Samsung GT-I5500 it is a different approach, in this case there is only one. Wherein
the S-5839i there were two processes for handling communication, here there is only
one. The process name is drexe, it was possible to extract some proprietary AT
commands from the process file. Reading the ASCII values of file, the process leaks
precious information about which AT commands are proprietary.
Figure 3.10 lists the AT commands successfully extracted, reading the ASCII values of
2lsof stands for "list open files" which is used in many Unix-like systems to report a list of all open files
and the processes that opened them
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Figure 3.9: Samsung AT commands IPC configuration on s5839i
the process drexe from device GT-I5500. Several commands mentioned here, were
also present in an online forum3, upon experiment with these commands by issuing
them through the channel and using once again realterm4. It was possible to note that
most of them are useless for an attack and are specific to the version of the Samsung
customization. Because it only works with the device GT-I5500. But by issuing the
command on the third line, AT+FUS?, we managed to place the smartphone instantly
in download mode in a vast array of Samsung devices listed on section 4.4.1.
The discovery of these commands reinforces the idea that, in fact there is some kind of
filtering done by the operating system of the AT commands. Why Samsung uses this
interface as a way to do non-baseband communication, such as this case, is beyond
our comprehension. Since AT commands where made to communicate with the modem
and not to place the smartphone in download mode.
3Forum XDA developers http://tinyurl.com/lekmpdv
4Realterm is a terminal program specially designed for capturing, controlling and debugging binary and
other difficult data streams. http://realterm.sourceforge.net/
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Figure 3.10: ASCII value of the process, where it is possible to extract a list of proprietary AT commands
3.2.3.2 Command “AT+DEVCONINFO”
The execution of the proprietary command AT+DEVCONINFO, in addition to obtaining
all the information displayed in 3.11, also triggers the smartphone to mount the SD card
on the computer as a mass storage device. As mentioned, when we eavesdropped
the connection, it was possible to confirm that this was the first command sent to
the smartphone by the Kies software. This assists the program in gathering all the
necessary information in order to work properly. As it can be seen in figure 3.11, the
information includes the smartphones’ firmware version, the smartphone model and
IMEI.
We also execute this command for identification of the device, since it gives all the
important information needed for identifying of the correct partition versions of the
device. For example in the figure, 3.11 shows that the device version, is S5839iBUlc1,
then s5839iCLLB2, s5839iBUlc1 and s5839iBUlc1. This helps us further identify the
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smartphone firmware, but we will further explain why we need this, in chapter 4.
Figure 3.11: Response message from issuing AT+DEVCONINFO
3.2.3.3 Command “AT+FUS?”
With the execution of the AT+FUS? the smartphone is placed in download mode, which
is the mode where all Samsung smartphones need to be in order to flash their internal
partitions and thus update the smartphone’s firmware. Normally putting the smartphone
in download mode involves mechanical key pressing, i.e., input from the user, which
implies acceptance to flash the smartphone. This is not the case when it is triggered by
the AT command, no user intervention is needed, which enables an automation of this
process. The discovery of this command, led us to assume that this how Kies updates
the firmware. Download mode is similar to fastboot mode that you find in other Android
smartphones, but in download mode it is impossible to use the fastboot tool for flashing
the firmware, which is included inside the Android SDK, only Odin and Heimdall serve
that purpose, which will be discussed further at 4.1.
This is the most damaging of the vulnerabilities, since it is possible to alter the partitions
inside the smartphone, explicitly injecting code on the desired partition. The novelty of
this attack, like the AT+DEVCONINFO command, is that no prior configuration is needed
on the smartphone. This is achievable just right after the smartphone is bought. Placing
the smartphone in download mode enables us to use Odin to flash the smartphone with
malicious partitions.
3.2.4 Master-Key vulnerability
Disclosed at Black Hat USA 2013 by Jeff Forristal [30], the master-key vulnerability
affects devices from Android 1.6 Donut through 4.2 Jelly Bean. Here the package
manager does not properly verify the signature of an application. Making it possible
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to change an application execution code and still hold a valid signature of original
application.
An .apk, which is the Android application file, is nothing more than .jar file with more
features, a .jar file is it is like a .zip file. In a .apk and in a .jar file there is a file
called MANIFEST.MF, which contains all the hashes of every file in the .apk or .jar
file. When you use jar signer on both of the types, an additional file is added, the .SF
file, this file holds a signed verification of every hash on the MANIFEST.MF file. On
top of that, in the .apk there is another file .RSA, which contains a signed hash of the
.SF file and a public certificate of that signature. This way an .apk has the capability
to hold integrity and to hold a signature and a public certificate of whom has signed it,
even though, there is no central authority to the certificate, it is the responsibility of the
user to trust that certificate.
Figure 3.12: APK file structure
As a normal .zip file, as well as an .apk file, it can hold several different files with
the same name, which is where the main problem lies. When that happens, the
Android system or better the package manager, which is the process that installs each
application, does not correctly verify the application signatures. This is the result of
having two different kinds of hash list implementations for indexing files inside the
.apk, one for signature verification, another is for loading content to actually run the
application.
During installation the java implementation of the LinkedHashMap is used to verify the
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signatures, this implies that when having two files with the same name, it will only store
the last one found by name. Upon execution, the Davlik virtual machine, using dexopt
written in C, uses and hashlist implementation written in C. What that does is that it will
execute the contents provided by the first file indexed, so when having two files with the
same name, it will index only the first one encountered.
So if there is a .apk file with two files with the same name, the first being the not signed
one, the one that you want to run and the second being the original signed one, the one
that you want to be verified. Android will verify the second and execute the first.
This has a tremendous implication on the security of the Android system, because you
can alter an application code without the Android system knowing. Applications by
signed by vendors have a special ability: they can ask for system permission. Using
this vulnerability, it is possible to alter execution code of one application that has been
signed by the vendor and with that gain system permission.
System permission is close to root and there are numerous ways to escalate from sys-
tem to root, but not applicable to every smartphone due different Android versions that
the smartphone may be running and security mechanism applied by the smartphone
manufacturer.
Chapter 4
Implementation
In this chapter, we use the vulnerabilities found and described in the previous chapter,
to explain in detail the attack process. That attack process is constituted by an attack
scenario and a proof of concept that fits the attack scenario. With this, we detail the
main architecture of the proof of concept, the different types of attacks used according
to which vulnerability, as well as a general explanation of why it is possible to do so.
We provide a list of vulnerable devices regarding one type of attack. In addition, we
develop an application for Android capable of mitigating the developed attacks.
4.1 Architecture
The script for the proof of concept has to be fast, fully automated, effective and able to
perform operations on numerous levels of the OS stack.
As shown in Figure 4.1, we deploy a script in a guest virtual machine containing Xubuntu
that, when necessary, is able to communicate with its Windows 7 host machine. We
used a Xubuntu virtual machine so that the script can take advantage of the Linux OS
scripting environment. Linux comes with libusb1 as a generic driver to handle USB
devices, which in turn lets us use the usbutils, thus making it more practical for scripts
like this to be developed. We detailed its functionalities further down.
As virtualization software, we use Virtual Box2. This program enables the creation of
1C library that gives applications easy access to USB devices http://www.libusb.org/
2VirtualBox virtualization software https://www.virtualbox.org/
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guest virtual machines and at running time it is possible to exchange the control of the
USB device from guest to host and vice-versa. In order to give the guest control over
the USB device, it presents a virtual USB controller to the guest, as soon as the guest
starts using the USB virtual device, the USB device will appear as unavailable to the
host. So only one OS has access to, thus can control, the USB connection at a time.
It is essential that the guest machine is Linux and the host is Windows and not the
other way around. This guarantees that the Samsung device drivers have direct access
to the USB device, which would not work inside a guest machine, because VirtualBox
emulates the devices. The type of attacks done by the guest machine supports this
emulation.
We have a host with Windows 7 so that it can have access to Odin3, a tool that is used
to flash partitions in Samsung devices. This tool is unable to work in Linux, because
of the dependence that it has on the Windows Samsung drivers. Other tools are able
to flash firmware on Samsung phones on Linux, like Heimdall4, but it are only able to
target a limited number of Samsung smartphones, whereas in the case of Odin it was
possible to target all Samsung smartphones.
A communication channel between the host and the guest is needed, in order that the
guest, which is doing most of the work can tell the host, when and which smartphone
to flash. For that we used a shared file between the guest and the host, so when the
guest needs to communicate it writes to the file. The host is polling the file for changes.
The roles are exchanged when the communication is in the opposite direction. Another
way to do this would be to hold a socket of communication between the two virtual
machines, by creating a specified TCP port.
In the guest machine, it is necessary that we configure a full list of the USB devices that
will be attacked, in order to tell the guest machine which devices to filter, so that they
could be controlled inside the guest and not on the host. This is done by identifying the
product ID and the vendor id, which together identifies all USB devices. The vendor ID
identifies the brand, for example Sony, the product ID identifies the product, for example
Xperia.
3Popular flashing tool for Windows http://odindownload.com/
4Cross-platform flashing tool http://glassechidna.com.au/heimdall
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Figure 4.1: Architecture of communication Guest OS and host OS.
The script running on the guest is responsible for:
• Detecting plugged USB devices;
• Identifying the type of device;
• Matching of the vulnerabilities found on that device;
• Attacking using the known vulnerabilities;
• Communicating with the host, in case the vulnerabilities require the use of the
Odin tool;
• Identifying the mounted external cards of USB devices.
The Windows 7 host is responsible for:
• Communicating with the guest, to know which device to flash;
CHAPTER 4. IMPLEMENTATION 45
• Identifying the flash image that matches the device and its firmware;
• Identifying the correct version of Odin for flashing;
• Use of GUI automation libraries, like Pywinauto5, in order to use Odin without
human intervention.
4.1.1 Control-flow of the attack
The algorithm running inside the guest Linux, aims to infect the plugged device with
the maximum dose available, according to the vulnerabilities documented in section 3.2
that match said device. Different types of vulnerabilities lead to different types of attack.
We established a hierarchy of attacks and the main aim is to obtain an attack of higher
order according to the vulnerabilities catalogued for the specific device. We call this
a hierarchy, since all attacks of higher order in our assumption, encompass all the
possibilities and more of each attack of lower order.
For example, the ability of flashing a compromised boot partition is of higher order than
to just of have an escalated ADB attack, since in the flashing attack, the attack is more
difficult to erase. This also is true for a privileged ADB attack, over a non-privileged at-
tack, for example a non-privileged ADB attack to just have GSM AT command interface.
The following attacks are ordered using the hierarchy:
1. Having AT+FUS? command possibility
2. Having ADB with possibility to privilege escalation
3. Having ADB with no possibility to privilege escalation
4. Having GSM AT command interface
As shown in figure 4.2, we developed a script in order to follow that hierarchy and detect
the attack of higher order to proceed.
5Windows GUI automation using Python https://code.google.com/p/pywinauto/
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Figure 4.2: A Flowchart of the algorithm, detailing the implementation of the hiearchy
4.2 Using the vulnerabilities found
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, the guest machine detects plugged devices,
identifies the smartphone version and platform, matches them to the vulnerabilities
found and executes the attacks that target those vulnerabilities. In this section, we
will cover the attacks.
4.2.1 AT command interface
Having the ability to issue AT commands to the modem, thus having the possibility to
make calls, the attacker could for obvious reasons exploit this breach, to either make
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calls to added cost numbers or, SMS subscriptions to added cost numbers. That way
the attack has a monetary end. For that purpose it we used the following AT commands
combination, when we have the possibility to issue AT commands over USB.
• For SMS:
AT+CMGF=1
AT+CMGS=+<ADDED_SMS_COST_NUMBER>
<SMS_TEXT>
• For making calls:
ATD + <ADDED_COST_CALL_NUMBER>
4.2.2 Enabled ADB connection
As mentioned, having ADB connection enabled could pose a serious threat. First, there
is the threat that an attacker uses this vector for privilege escalation. Here the attacker
explores the capability to escalate the privilege of simple shell access, to root or system.
Then there is another possibility given by ADB enabled, of installing applications without
user consent, for example, the attacker could install a surveillance application with
maximum permissions available for an application. So a non-privileged ADB attack
could do anything that explores the capabilities mentioned. It is really up to the attacker
to choose which one. In our proof of concept, we use this vulnerability either to escalate
privileges, or to install a surveillance application.
4.2.2.1 Privileged escalation and master key vulnerability
For privileged escalation, we chose the master key vulnerability, described in sec-
tion 3.2.4, to gain system access. We picked the master key vulnerability, since it is one
of the most recent vulnerabilities disclosed that enables privileged escalation. It affects
a very wide range of Android versions, from 1.6 up to 4.2. Additionally the master key
vulnerability is a flaw on the Android system, not just in vendor customization, thus it is
possible to treat all Android smartphones alike.
Applications that are platform signed can request for system permissions on the mani-
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fest file. Using the master key vulnerability, it is possible to change the execution code
of a platform signed application, without any problems on the installation and execution.
For this use we chose an application signed by Samsung, in this case we choose a cisco
Virtual Private Network (VPN) application, this application installation requests system
permission in order to run, making it a good candidate for a malicious modification and
installation.
We just need to compile a manifest compatible classex.dex file, the main calling
class has to maintain the same name, but the actual implementation is changed to run
any wanted code.
We used 7zip6 to alter the original .apk file, to add the malicious classes.dex in
first and the original classex.dex second inside the .apk file. Doing it the other way
around the vulnerability would not work.
Figure 4.3: Files inside .apk after added compromised classes.dex
After having the malicious application created, we make use of the enabled ADB to
install the malicious application. That is possible without any user consent, unless the
Android version of the phone is above the 4.2.2 version, in which case the user must
consent the ADB connection to the computer.
The goal here is not yet defined, but upon having an application with system permission
on the phone, the possibilities are open. Depending on the Android version and the
phone model, it is possible to escalate it further to root. In some versions of Android
prior to 4.1, with system permission it is possible to change the local prop file. Re-
writing the attribute ro.kernel.qemu to 1, this way, the operating system thinks it is
67-Zip is a open source file archive with a high compression ratio. http://www.7-zip.org/
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an emulator instead of a real phone. This gives root access to the ADB connection and
with this it is possible to root the phone.
In addition, it has full access to the data folder on the Android phone, which contains
user data, contacts, messages and settings. This folder holds important information
about the user and upon having system permission with malicious intent, it should not
be considered safe anymore.
4.3 "AT+FUS?" and flashing of the boot partition
4.3.1 Device identification.
The purpose of this attack, is first to identify the firmware version of the smartphone with
the command AT+DEVCONINFO, as it was shown in figure 3.12. This enables to identify
the firmware version of the smartphone in question. For example in figure 3.12 it is pos-
sible to identify by VER(S5839iBULE2/EUR_CSC/S5839iBULC1/ S5839iBULE2),
which shows the following details as per the format PDA, CSC, Modem and Boot:
• PDA: The build version, which includes the system partition.
• Country Sales Code (CSC): (Country Sales Code): Language and country
parameters.
• Modem: Identifying the modem firmware version.
• Boot: For the version of the Boot partition.
4.3.2 Changing the Boot Image.
As described in section 3.2.3.3 the AT command AT+FUS? places the phone in down-
load mode and allows flashing a new boot partition. The boot partition is where the first
line of code to be executed, when any Android smartphone is booted, is. The primary
functions of the boot partition are:
• to mount the primary partitions necessary for the system to boot;
• start the first process of all operating systems based on Linux, i.e. the init
process;
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• read and execute the init.rc boot configuration file;
• load the kernel and the ramdisk.
Figure 4.4: Structure of a typical PDA file.
Figure 4.4 illustrates a firmware file about to be flashed on a device. The boot partition
is placed in a boot.img type file, which is inside of the PDA file. This file in turn is as
tar file with a checksum, usually a .tar.md5. Inside the PDA file there is also the System
partition. In order to flash we only need the boot.img file. For the proof of concept,
we re-construct a stock boot partition.
The bootloader is not exactly the same as the boot image [31]. The bootloader is the
very first piece of software that is executed on a device. It detects which boot images to
initialize, in typical Android operating system the bootloader either starts the recovery
mode or the normal mode. In most Android smartphones the boootloader is locked,
which means that it verifies the integrity and signatures of the partitions before it starts
them. This prevents any modification of the partitions, such as the boot or the system by
an unauthorized third party. Samsung devices bootloader is typically unlocked, which
means a further modification of the partitions is possible, thus enabling our attack.
Figure 4.5 shows in a very simple way the role of the bootloader, presenting one of its
main functions, which is to boot either the recovery mode, or the normal mode, each
explaining its functionalities.
In order to modify the boot.img file, it is necessary to extract the ramdisk and the
kernel first, from the boot.img. Then modify what is needed and pack everything
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Figure 4.5: Boot sequence from [7]
again, in the correct file format. Normally the boot.img file is divided in two parts, the
Kernel and the ramdisk. The ramdisk is the first file system mounted on the root of the
system. There it is possible to find files like the init file and the init.rc [32], the
image that is used in the booting process of the smartphone and various other folders
needed for good performance of the system. In the init.rc file several shell type
instructions are found for the initial configuration of the system, as well as instructions
that will be executed with root access by the init process. It is in this file that the
ramdisk of the boot partition will be altered, adding malicious instructions.
In this scenario we want to achieve three different goals by altering the boot partition,
first we want to make the ADB always enabled, second we want to obtain root access,
third we want install a surveillance application, in this case Androrat, which is described
below.
4.3.2.1 First objective, make adb always enabled
For the first objective, we altered on property:persist.service.adb.enable=0.
This property tells the system, what operations to do when disabling ADB. In the
original file it stated that when it was to disable adb, it would stop Android Debug
Bridge Daemon (ADBD), effectively stopping the ADBD on the smartphone. This was
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changed from stop ADBD to start ADBD, rendering it impossible to disable the ADB
from configuration, even thought it might appear disabled in the systems’ options.
4.3.2.2 Second objective, obtain root access
For the second objective, we want to obtain root access on the smartphone using the su
binary file [33]. This binary configured with permissions of execution for everyone and
with the owner as root, enables any user to have root access. We placed the su inside
the ramdisk, at boot it will be placed by the bootloader on the root of the system. Then
we added the following lines in the init.rc so that it is copied to /system/xbin/
folder.
• copy /su /system/xbin/su
• chmod 06755 /system/xbin/su
• chown root /system/xbin/su
This will allow root access to any user, for example when ADB is enabled it will have
root access.
4.3.2.3 Third objective, install an surveillance application
For the third objective, we will install a surveillance application on the device, in this
case Androrat which stands for Android RAT [34], in a way that the user does not know
of its existence. First application .apk file is placed inside the ramdisk directory, so that
once it boots, it places the .apk in the root of the system, similar to what had been done
for su. And again the following code was added to the initi.rc file, so that it copies
the file to the apps folder.
• copy /AndroRat.apk /system/apps/AndroRat.apk
Once it boots, the application is installed as a system app. This way the application can
never be removed, even with root access, since it is permanently flashed on the boot
partition and every-time the system boots, the application is installed.
The AndroRat application enables several remote surveillance capabilities on the phone:
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• Get contacts (and all their information);
• Get call logs;
• Get all messages;
• Location by GPS or Network;
• Monitor received messages live;
• Monitor phone state live (call received, call sent, call missed);
• Take a picture with the camera;
• Stream sound from microphone (or other sources);
• Stream video;
• Do a toast;
• Send a text message;
• Make a call;
• Open an URL in the default browser;
• Vibrate the phone.
AndroRat is composed of a client and a server, the client is the application that is
installed on the phone, the server runs on a PC, regardless if it is a Windows, Linux or
Mac, since it runs in a Java virtual machine. The client communicates with the server
by TCP/IP. In the original application the client launches an activity so that the users
inserts the IP of the remote server, this has been altered so that the application can
get the server IP by parsing a file on Dropbox with a static URL, thus not needing
the user input, which makes the application unnoticeable. Also the original application
AndroidManifest.xml file was changed, deleting the following lines:
<intent-filter>
<action Android:name="Android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
<category
Android:name="Android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
</intent-filter>
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This way making the icon not visible in the app section of the smartphone, so an
inexperienced user would not detect the malicious application.
4.3.3 Installing the new boot image
The boot partition is extremely sensitive to the smartphones’ hardware, as well as the
firmware. Every different type of hardware for the smartphone has its own specialized
boot partition. That is one of the reasons that there is a vast selection of ROMS, to
cover all the variety of hardware in the Android family.
For a successful attack, we created a dictionary of previously altered boot partitions,
in order to encompass all the different smartphones in the attack list. For example,
for the bundle version presented with VER(S5839iBULE2/EUR_CSC/S5839iBULC1/
S5839iBULE2), we map this bundle version to a previously altered boot image that
matches this version.
After an initial identification of the smartphone version from the Linux guest machine,
we place the cellphone in download mode, we also notify the host machine, so that it
could hand over the control of the USB device to the host. When putting the device in
download mode, its product ID and vendor ID is altered, to a non-filtered combination
of vendor ID and product ID by VirtualBox, rendering the process of handing over
the control of the USB device automatic. The guest machine saves the IMEI of the
smartphone, so that once the phone reboots, it already knows that it is a compromised
smartphone, which would enable the guest to do other type of attack, since the ADB is
on and the phone is rooted.
After the host is notified to flash the device with the firmware version, it maps the given
version to a previously altered boot image that is ready to be flashed. It also maps the
correct version of Odin.
Using a GUI automation tool for Windows, the host commands Odin to choose the
correct image file folder and name and then to flash the phone. The smartphone
proceeds with the flashing of the partitions and reboots normally. After rebooting, its
product ID and vendor ID changes once more to the previous ones, handing over again
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the control of the USB connection to the guest machine, so that it is possible to proceed
with the attack.
First the Guest Linux does:
1. Detection of plugged USB devices.
2. Matching of its vulnerability.
3. Checks if it has a compromised boot partition.
4. Notifies the boot image to flash the device and saves the IMEI.
5. Places the phone in download mode.
Then the Host Windows does:
6. Identification of which file matches give version.
7. Makes use of GUI automation tools to control Odin and flash the phone
And again the Guest finishes with:
8. Proceeds with the rest of the attack, now that it possesses root access and ADB
enabled.
4.3.4 GUI automation tools
To fit our attack scenario, so that no human interaction is needed, we make usage of
GUI automation tools, in this case Pywinauto [35], it is important that we mention these
tools used and how we used them.
Odin is the reason why we need GUI automation tools, it is needed for the step respon-
sible for flashing a boot partition. When issuing the command AT+FUS?, the device
enters download mode, a series of GUI automation steps are needed for interaction
with Odin, namely for selection of the boot image and also for clicking on the start
button, to start flashing.
In the case of Samsung devices, Odin detects automatically when a device is ready for
flashing, their USB product ID is altered internally when the device transits to download
mode, in this way Odin detects that the device is ready for being flashed.
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So we only need to the automation for selecting the Odin window, then select the boot
partition from the folders and then to click in start download.
As shown in figure 4.6, Odin detects that it has a ready device for flashing, it is at this
precise moment, which our script will start as well as its automation tool.
Figure 4.6: Odin program interface
First step of the automation tool, is to select the Odin window, so the program had to
been previously launched.
The Ubuntu script, which handles the identification, sends the identification information
of the device and the scripts running on Windows 7 will match the device identification to
the correct folder and file of the boot partition to flash. We have a dictionary in Python,
which matches the device information, with the correct boot file and folder.
After the automation tool selects the file, it just needs to click start in order that the
device receives the partition file.
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4.4 Tests
We performed several tests, all regarding the vulnerability that enables us to flash
device, i.e., sending the command AT+FUS? over USB and successfully flashing the
device with a compromised partition. First, we give a list of Samsung devices tested
and a list of devices where the vulnerability was present.. After that, we give an analysis
of behavior facing that vulnerability with certain popular anti-virus apps.
4.4.1 Tested smartphones
We successfully verified the attack on the following phones:
• Samsung GT-S5839i
• Samsung GT-I5500
And, by issuing the AT commands, it was possible to confirm that the vulnerability was
present on the following phones:
• Samsung I9300 Galaxy S III
• Samsung GT-S7500
• Samsung GT-S5830
• Samsung I9100
• Samsung S7560M
It is necessary that the smartphone has an original ROM from Samsung. We expect
that the span of vulnerable versions of Samsung smartphones be much more wide than
this, since in our assumption, having the vulnerability or not is implicitly related with the
ability that the smartphone has on communicating with Kies software. So as far as we
now, most (if not all) Samsung smartphones are supported by Kies.
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4.4.2 Tested Anti-Virus
AVG, Avast, CM Security and virus scanner [36, 37, 38, 39] were the anti-virus
chosen for testing7. First we examined if any of them detected/prevented the attack,
later after the attack, we examined if any of them detected malicious software on the
phone.
The results are that none of them prevented the attack at first. After the attack and after
a scan had been performed, AVG detected that Androrat was installed and informed
the user that it could be malicious. However, upon trying to uninstall the threat it states
that it cannot, nothing more has been detected by AVG.
CM security after a scan had been performed, did not detect any vulnerabilities with
the attack.
The other two virus scanner applications did not find anything wrong with the device.
None of them detected alterations to the init.rc file, or the su binary that was added,
comparing to a previous state of the smartphone. This is a result of the lack of power
that usual anti-virus apps have. Since most attackers exploit and pursue an attack
vector that ends with having root access, which gives the attacker the upper hand
against preventive applications such as these, with lower level access.
Because of this lack of power, such as these ones, even requesting all permissions
available, have little room to detect/prevent attacks as this one. They have limited ability
to scan certain areas of storage of the smartphone, like the root system folder, where
the ramdisk is loaded at boot and the init.rc file is. Also they have very limited
capability in removing the applications, like Androrat, because it is a system application.
4.5 USB Secure
Based upon the knowledge gathered with the research of vulnerabilities and of attacks
over USB connection, we developed an Android application, which can safely let An-
droid users charge their smartphones on public kiosks, without any fear of attacks.
Unfortunately, the application needs root permission to activate the security mechanism
7 All anti-virus were tested in 9th of June of 2014. AVG version was 4.1.1, Avast version was 3.0.7 ,CM
security 1.6.1 and Virus Scanner 1.4.3
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necessary, so the owner of the device needs a previously rooted the device.
The application is listening if any new USB connection is done and when it is, it prompts
a warning activity to the foreground of the device, asking if the user trusts or not that
connection.
If the user trusts the connection, the application does nothing and simply quits. In case
the user does not trust, a series of security mechanisms will be triggered. There are
two types of security mechanisms. Security mechanisms are platform independent,
such as ADB enabled and mechanisms regarding the vulnerabilities found for specific
products, which are platform dependent. Examples of these are vulnerabilities such as
the ability to send AT commands over the USB connection.
4.5.1 Architecture
The application requires that the Android phone has at least version 2.2–2.2.3 Froyo
(API level 8). And targets Android 4.3 Jelly Bean (API level 18).
To detect the USB connection, it was necessary to have a BroadcastReceiver. A
BroadcastReceiver is basically a listener of intents that are broadcasted on the
Android system. Intents are little messages that constitute the Android IPC, in the ap-
plication layer. They could represent intention of an action, like launching an activity, or
just general information about the phone state, like receiving a phone call, or the device
as USB cable plugged. In order that a BroadCastReceiver receive the necessary
intents, it has to be declared first in the AndroidManifest.xml, in the intent filter of
that component. There it is registered the specific types of intents that are necessary
that our BroadcastReceiver to listen to, in this case it is declared that intents are of
ACTION_POWER_DISCONNECTED and ACTION_POWER_CONNECTED. Both represent
when the external power has been connected or not.
When an external power has been connected, it will trigger the activity warning the
user, asking if he trusts the USB connection. When the external power has been
disconnected, it will reverse the mechanisms triggered.
Since the application is listening to the intents, ACTION_POWER_DISCONNECTED and
ACTION_POWER_CONNECTED, it will prompt in an USB data connection or a simple
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USB power charge.
4.5.1.1 Warning Activity
The warning activity is the main and only activity on the application. It issues a prompt
when the user connects the USB cable, this way reminding the user that vulnerability
may arise from a USB connection. It also provides availability so that the user does not
have to search for the application at that moment.
The activity basically warns the user of the danger attached to that USB connection
and asks to trust or not the connection. In the trusting case, nothing is done, but if
the user does not trust the USB connection, a series of security mechanisms will be
deployed. By default, the application triggers the security mechanism if a new USB
connection plugs, only in the case the user does not trust the USB connection the
security mechanisms will cease.
Figure 4.7: Interface of the warning activity
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4.5.2 Security Mechanisms
There are two kind of security mechanisms, one that tackles general vulnerabilities.
The other kind is security mechanisms that tackle vulnerabilities found on specific
devices. The other kind is security mechanisms that tackle vulnerabilities found on
specific devices.
To cope with future scalability that could arise from vulnerabilities attached with spe-
cific devices, we implement design patterns [40]. Therefore, when future updates are
needed, an update could easily be developed.
The design pattern is a simple one, we use the factory method .The principal role of
this pattern is that we have a “factory” that returns the correct object with the concrete
implementations, according to the device model. The factory detects the device model
and returns an object that implements the security mechanism for that device. That
objects extends an abstract object with the abstract function for the platform dependent
mechanism and implements a platform independent mechanism.
So with this approach for any new platform dependent vulnerabilities discovered, a new
class implementing the mechanism for that platform can be created. And any new
platform independent vulnerabilities discovered, only an abstract class is created. This
way updating every object that extends that class.
So far, the following mechanisms are triggered:
• Platform independent: root privileges are used, to disable ADB connection.
• Platform dependent: Differs from platform to platform, so far only the device
GT-s5839i is covered. For the GT-s5839i the main process that deals with the
AT commands communication from USB to the modem is killed, which is the
dun_mgr. After terminating this process, the atx process is terminated as well.
Since without root access further security prevention is impossible, for non-rooted phones
we added a warning message, which shows the vulnerabilities that the phone may be
in, as shown in 4.9.
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Figure 4.8: UML chart of the factory method implemented
Figure 4.9: Warning activity notifying user that it can not trigger the security mechanisms
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we detail several USB vulnerabilities in Android and in the vendor
customization of Android. In the research of vulnerabilities, we successfully unveil a
new kind of attack by sending AT commands over USB, which is possible in some
vendors’ customization, to flash the phone with a compromised boot partition, with
that, we were able obtain root access, install a surveillance application and make ADB
always enabled. After that, the device is compromised.
Regarding the ability to send the AT commands over USB to Samsung devices, we
believe it is not a bug in the development of the system, as these functionalities are
intended to be used by the computer application of the vendor to configure and manage
the smartphone. In our view, implementation of such “features” should be at least dis-
closed to users, in order that they understand the risks of an exposed USB connection.
A comprehensive list of vulnerable devices is given, with regards to the vulnerabilities
of the Samsung customization of devices. A series of anti-virus application are tested,
to observe if any prevented the attack, or if after the attack occurs, they detect that the
device is compromised and none of them prevents or detects the attack.
We give a practical attack scenario where such attack could be carried out, where
normal users might be more prone to be infected. With that scenario in mind, we
develop a proof of concept of the attack with characteristics that fits the attack scenario,
like being fully automated.
Since the vulnerabilities are device depend, the proof of concept has been built with a
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hierarchy of attacks, in which the aim of that hierarchy is to produce the maximum dose
of attack, according to the device and to the vulnerabilities found.
Also with the success in attacking the device with such vulnerabilities, we were able
to develop an application for Android, specially designed to prevent said attack. Unfor-
tunately in order to completely mitigate the problem, the application needs to request
root permission, in case it does not have it, it will just inform the users that it might be
vulnerable.
5.1 Future work
Concerning the list of vulnerable devices, it is important to we continue to expand it by
the experimenting with new devices, taking advantage of this, it would be important to
notice as well, how many Samsung devices have an unlocked bootloader, since without
it the attack could not happen.
We would like also to extend this attack to other manufacturers and find if any of them
allow us to produce similar attacks. And if successful, we would like to add to our
anti-virus application, security mechanisms to help mitigate the problem.
Dealing with the attack scenario, it would be an interesting to do a social experiment to
find how many devices we could attack by hour, in a public charging kiosk. Experiment-
ing in different places, different environments to determine which of those environments
people are more prone to be infected.
Appendix A
Abbreviations
USB Universal Serial Bus
OS Operating System
ADB Android Debug Bridge
ADBD Android Debug Bridge Daemon
IPC Inter-Process communication
GPS Global Positioning System
SMS Short Message Service
AP Applications Processor
BP Baseband Processor
RIL Radio Interface Layer
NFC Near Field Communication
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
API Application Programming Interface
MITM Man-in-the-Middle Attack
RFS Remote File System
RPC Remote Procedural Calls
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VPN Virtual Private Network
CSC Country Sales Code
RAT Remote Access Tool
RILD Radio Interface Layer Daemon
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